Post by DevAdv on Mar 7, 2009 14:28:35 GMT -5
Here's a first shot at an argument with an interesting conclusion concerning the APA's Non-Discrimination Policy. I'd be grateful for any comments or criticisms.
Smith is a philosopher and a pedophile. Also, he’s scrupulously law-abiding: he only indulges his sexual appetites in foreign countries where the laws regarding pedophilia are very different from our own. Since he is so scrupulously law-abiding, and since he believes that pedophilia is clearly morally permissible, he is very open about his pedophilia. It has therefore become public knowledge. This Fall, Smith plans to go on the job market, and will apply to work as a philosophy professor at many universities that advertise in the JFP.
(1) It’s morally permissible for a university to discriminate against Smith on the basis of his pedophilia.
Pedophilia is clearly morally depraved. It is morally permissible for a job description to require that the candidate, if hired, not engage in morally depraved behavior such as pedophilia. It is morally permissible for universities to require that their philosophy professors be – at least to some degree – moral exemplars, mentors, or role models. A pedophile would fail to meet that job description, and could therefore legitimately be discriminated against in the hiring process.
(2) Either Smith’s pedophilia is a sexual orientation, or it isn’t
(3) If Smith’s pedophilia is not a sexual orientation, then homosexuality isn’t a sexual orientation.
Pedophiles just find themselves with certain sexual proclivities. For at least some pedophiles, this attraction isn’t a lifestyle decision. No, for at least some people, pedophilia is an innate orientation, a deeply seated character trait. Smith is such a person. In these respects, pedophilia seems perfectly similar to homosexuality (and, I hasten to add, heterosexuality). So, if pedophilia doesn’t qualify as a sexual orientation, clearly homosexuality (or heterosexuality) doesn’t either.
(4) If homosexuality isn’t a sexual orientation, then discriminating on the basis of it doesn’t violate APA policy.
The APA policy prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, age, gender, and sexual orientation. Homosexuality isn’t a race, or an age, or a gender. So if it’s not a sexual orientation, the APA policy doesn’t prohibit discrimination on its basis.
(5) If Smith’s pedophilia is a sexual orientation, then it’s morally permissible to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.
This follows from 1.
(6) If it’s morally permissible to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, then the APA’s prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is unwarranted.
Presumably the APA has accepted this policy on what they perceive to be solid moral grounds: the APA collectively believes that it’s morally wrong to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. But if it’s actually morally permissible to discriminate on that basis, then the APA’s policy is crucially based on a false belief. Let’s say it is therefore “unwarranted,” and should be revised.
(7) Therefore, either discriminating on the basis of homosexuality doesn’t violate the APA policy, or the APA’s prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is unwarranted.
This follows from 2, 3&4, and 5&6.
(8) If discriminating on the basis of homosexuality doesn’t violate the APA policy, then Wheaton et al. don’t violate the APA policy.[/color]
Maybe Wheaton et al. violate the policy for some other reason, but I haven’t heard any such allegations. I believe the charge against Wheaton et al. is that they violate the APA’s hiring policy only because they discriminate on the basis of homosexuality. But then if discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation doesn’t actually violate the APA’s hiring policy, then Wheaton et al. are in the clear.
(9) If the APA’s prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is unwarranted, then it’s of no moral concern that Wheaton et al. violate the APA’s policy.
If a moral prohibition is crucially based on a false moral belief (that’s what I mean by “unwarranted” here), then violating that moral prohibition is of no moral concern.
(10) Therefore, either Wheaton et al. don’t violate the APA policy, or it’s of no moral concern that Wheaton et al. violate the APA’s policy.
Smith is a philosopher and a pedophile. Also, he’s scrupulously law-abiding: he only indulges his sexual appetites in foreign countries where the laws regarding pedophilia are very different from our own. Since he is so scrupulously law-abiding, and since he believes that pedophilia is clearly morally permissible, he is very open about his pedophilia. It has therefore become public knowledge. This Fall, Smith plans to go on the job market, and will apply to work as a philosophy professor at many universities that advertise in the JFP.
(1) It’s morally permissible for a university to discriminate against Smith on the basis of his pedophilia.
Pedophilia is clearly morally depraved. It is morally permissible for a job description to require that the candidate, if hired, not engage in morally depraved behavior such as pedophilia. It is morally permissible for universities to require that their philosophy professors be – at least to some degree – moral exemplars, mentors, or role models. A pedophile would fail to meet that job description, and could therefore legitimately be discriminated against in the hiring process.
(2) Either Smith’s pedophilia is a sexual orientation, or it isn’t
(3) If Smith’s pedophilia is not a sexual orientation, then homosexuality isn’t a sexual orientation.
Pedophiles just find themselves with certain sexual proclivities. For at least some pedophiles, this attraction isn’t a lifestyle decision. No, for at least some people, pedophilia is an innate orientation, a deeply seated character trait. Smith is such a person. In these respects, pedophilia seems perfectly similar to homosexuality (and, I hasten to add, heterosexuality). So, if pedophilia doesn’t qualify as a sexual orientation, clearly homosexuality (or heterosexuality) doesn’t either.
(4) If homosexuality isn’t a sexual orientation, then discriminating on the basis of it doesn’t violate APA policy.
The APA policy prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, age, gender, and sexual orientation. Homosexuality isn’t a race, or an age, or a gender. So if it’s not a sexual orientation, the APA policy doesn’t prohibit discrimination on its basis.
(5) If Smith’s pedophilia is a sexual orientation, then it’s morally permissible to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.
This follows from 1.
(6) If it’s morally permissible to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, then the APA’s prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is unwarranted.
Presumably the APA has accepted this policy on what they perceive to be solid moral grounds: the APA collectively believes that it’s morally wrong to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. But if it’s actually morally permissible to discriminate on that basis, then the APA’s policy is crucially based on a false belief. Let’s say it is therefore “unwarranted,” and should be revised.
(7) Therefore, either discriminating on the basis of homosexuality doesn’t violate the APA policy, or the APA’s prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is unwarranted.
This follows from 2, 3&4, and 5&6.
(8) If discriminating on the basis of homosexuality doesn’t violate the APA policy, then Wheaton et al. don’t violate the APA policy.[/color]
Maybe Wheaton et al. violate the policy for some other reason, but I haven’t heard any such allegations. I believe the charge against Wheaton et al. is that they violate the APA’s hiring policy only because they discriminate on the basis of homosexuality. But then if discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation doesn’t actually violate the APA’s hiring policy, then Wheaton et al. are in the clear.
(9) If the APA’s prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is unwarranted, then it’s of no moral concern that Wheaton et al. violate the APA’s policy.
If a moral prohibition is crucially based on a false moral belief (that’s what I mean by “unwarranted” here), then violating that moral prohibition is of no moral concern.
(10) Therefore, either Wheaton et al. don’t violate the APA policy, or it’s of no moral concern that Wheaton et al. violate the APA’s policy.